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 (Re)locating the Border: Pre-entry tuberculosis (TB) screening of migrants to the UK 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the UK government’s recent expansion of pre-entry tuberculosis (TB) screening 
of visa applicants to include migrants from over 80 countries. I will focus on how the offshoring of 
infectious disease surveillance, often conducted on behalf of the UK government by a third party, has 
(re)shaped the spatialities of border control. During last two decades, human mobility has increased 
exponentially, with worldwide passenger traffic carried on scheduled airlines almost trebling to nearly 
three billion. Nation states have sought to regulate these mobilities in order manage risk and filter out 
‘threatening’ bodies. In particular, states and transnational organisations (such as the EU) are 
increasingly outsourcing border controls to overseas territories where migrant bodies are screened 
prior to departure. Yet, although scholars have conceptualised the relocated border in relation to 
counter-terrorism and national security, there has been less consideration of the effects of these 
changes on geographies of health security. This paper seeks to address this gap in knowledge through 
a qualitative case study of the changing geographies of detection and management of TB at (and 
beyond) the border in view of recent policy announcements by the UK government. I consider extent to 
which UK health security enactments have resulted in a 'biosecuritisation' of the offshore border as they 
continue to be implemented across diverse spatial and political settings. In conclusion, I identify the 
need for further theoretical and empirical investigation into the impact of these measures on the scales 
of public health governance and spaces of biosecurity and biosurveillance.  
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(Re)locating the Border: Pre-entry tuberculosis (TB) screening of migrants to the UK 
 
1. Introduction  
 
On 21 May 2012, the UK government announced a dramatic expansion of its pre-entry tuberculosis 
(TB) screening of migrants from ‘high risk’ countries and the withdrawal of chest x-ray examinations 
directed at this group on arrival at London Heathrow and Gatwick airports (Home Office, 2012a). Taken 
together, these measures represented a significant acceleration by the UK of the ‘offshoring’ of state 
border enactments and, when fully implemented, will affect migrants from over 80 countries who seek 
to remain in the UK for more than six months. This decision, justified by the UK Home Office on both 
medical and cost grounds, represented a continuation of the shift in national geographies of health 
security (Braun, 2007), with state borders – particularly in countries in the global North1 – continuing to 
be (re)located to territories in the global South. As a result, selected sovereign states are ‘sorting’ and 
‘securitising’ ever more mobile bodies from a distance (Lyon, 2007a, 2007b).   
 
During the last two decades, facilitated by rapid expansion and progressive liberalisation of global air 
travel (Budd et al., 2011), human mobility has increased exponentially with worldwide passenger traffic 
carried on scheduled airlines almost trebling from one billion in 1987 to approximately 2.8 billion in 
2011 (IATA, 2005, 2012). Nation states, whilst recognising the need for selected, 'skilled', bodies to 
foster economic development (Hollifield, 2004), have sought to regulate these mobilities in order to 
manage potential risks, and filter 'acceptable' bodies from 'threatening ones' (Cresswell, 2012: 650). 
The national border is a point where the human body is ‘dissected’, taken apart ‘in order to reveal 
something of the unknown future hidden within’ (Amoore and Hall, 2009: 448). This could be revealed 
through the discovery of a concealed weapon, contraband or infectious bacteria. Accordingly, the 
border represents a site at which risk governance procedures be enacted. Yet, within a more mobile 
and globally connected world, borders are 'multiplying and becoming more dispersed' (Cresswell, 2012: 
650). In particular, states and transnational organisations such as the EU, frequently sited in the global 
                                                          
1 The ‘global North’ is a term frequently used to by geographers to describe ‘developed’, often Anglophone countries. As 
such, it can refer to Australia and New Zealand, as well as the UK and US. Although useful as a frame of reference, it is 
important that scholars – not least in order to avoid reinforcing representations of the North and South - challenge the 
conceptualisations inherent within this dualism. For further discussion refer, for example, to Dodds (1999) and Payne 
(2005). 
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North, are ‘outsourc[ing]’ border controls to overseas territories, with 'foreign' bodies being screened 
prior to departure (van Houtum, 2010: 962). Although geographers and social scientists have recently 
conceptualised the relocated border in relation to national security (Amoore, 2006; Adey, 2009; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2010), there has been less consideration of the effects of these changes on the 
geographies of health security. Granted, concerns have been raised about the impact of heightened 
human mobility on the rapid spread of pathogens across state boundaries, particularly following 
outbreaks of SARS and H1N1 influenza during the last decade (Budd et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the 
cross-border transmission of TB, a disease which many health professionals working in the middle part 
of the twentieth century believed could be eradicated, has been less widely researched. Although a 
longstanding topic of scholarly investigation by historians and social scientists (Farmer, 1997; Gandy 
and Zumla, 2002; Bell et al., 2006; Welshman, 2006; Welshman and Bashford, 2006), there has been 
little attention paid to the changing geographies of the detection and management of TB at (and 
beyond) the border. This is surprising given its increased prevalence in countries of the global North 
during recent decades, and its representation in the popular imagination as a disease associated with 
'immigration' (Bell et al., 2006: 584).   
 
This paper will address this lacuna, and advance theoretical understandings of the intersection 
between territoriality, biosecurity and surveillance through an empirical investigation of UK 
government’s recent expansion of pre-entry TB screening of visa applicants to include migrants from 
over 80 countries. I will focus on how the offshoring of infectious disease surveillance, often conducted 
on behalf of the UK government by a third party, has (re)shaped the spatialities of border control. The 
paper will develop research from geography, and the social sciences more broadly, and refer to official, 
or 'grey', literature. In addition, I will draw on in-depth interviews, and correspondence, conducted with 
public officials working in the border security and health sectors within the UK, and overseas. In doing 
so, I will seek to identify a new 'biosecuritisation' of the offshore border, highlighting areas for further 
geographical inquiry.  
 
 
 
2. Relocating boundaries: redefining borders and (bio)securing bodies 
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2.1 Changing borders 
The changing conceptions of sovereign borders has been theorised within the scholarly literature on 
the spaces of security (Salter, 2004; Adey, 2004, 2009; Amoore, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2008; 
Amoore and Hall, 2009; Philo, 2012). For example, Philo has drawn attention to the existence of ‘highly 
uneven and entangled geographies of security and insecurity’ across ‘a range of spatial scales’ 
including homes, nation states and modes of travel (2012: 1). According to Philo, these ‘uneven’ 
geographies are an integral part of an ‘‘establishment’ discourse, bound up in the strategising of states 
and supra-state organisations’, particularly in the global North, in response ‘to so-called global ‘terror’, 
‘criminality’ or ‘radicalisation’’ (2012: 1). Specifically, geographers and political scientists have 
investigated the impact of state actions on conceptualisation of the border in relation to national 
security strategies adopted by states following the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. 
For instance, Amoore dissected the concept of the ‘biometric border’ where scientific technologies and 
‘managerial’ expertise combined to govern traveller mobilities (2006: 36), Adey explored the extent to 
which pre-emptive securitisation resulted in the mobile body becoming ‘a site of observation, 
calculation, prediction, and action’ in the process of moving across borders (2009: 274) and Vaughan-
Williams examined how borders were ‘changing’ and ‘multiplying’ as a result of increased EU 
surveillance activities (2008: 63). This research indicated that the border extended beyond the 
geographical boundaries of the state with much of the actual processing of information, for example, 
during visa applications, occurring ‘upstream’, in the receiving country, as states sought to profile and 
pre-emptively ‘secure’ the mobile body prior to embarkation (Salter, 2004: 80; see also Adey, 2004, 
2009).  
 
According to Elden, in his analysis of the spatial aspects of the 'war on terror', such pre-emptive 
practices necessitated 'a rethinking of the sovereignty/territory bind', to take account of circumstances 
whereby one state's (in this instance, the US's) enforcement of the inviolability of its own territory 
required the 'absolute contingency of sovereignty over territory elsewhere' (2007: 840, 839). Through 
this creation of 'exceptional legal and biopolitical geographies' (Morrissey, 2011a: 457), the governance 
of human life (or 'biopolitics') has been played out in selected, often extra-territorial, spaces. These 
interactions have been widely critiqued. Morrissey drew attention to both the creation of ‘defensive’ 
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biopolitical spaces, such as Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Force Base, by the US government, and 
the considered legal designation and protection of US military personnel, via the securing of ‘land 
access’, in order to maintain a ‘forward presence’ on selected overseas territories (2011b: 287-8). 
Further, Martin, in his study of US empire, problematised the US territorial intervention as part of its 
‘war on terror’ as a ‘discretionary activit[y]’, part of a financial logic whereby risk and self-management 
are borne by the occupied, whilst an 'indifferent' occupying country sought to selectively engage in 
order to effect certain goals such as security and capital accumulation (2007: 5-6). Yet, whilst this 
mitigation of risk through territorial acquisition has been theorised by geographers in relation to the 'war 
on terror' and its associated military activities, less attention has been paid to the particular spatial 
strategies - not necessarily reliant on states of 'exception' (Agamben, 2005), but significant 
nevertheless - deployed by sovereign territories to secure their borders against threats posed by 
infectious diseases.  
 
2.2 Biosecurity and biosurveillance  
Over the last decade, outbreaks of highly pathogenic diseases, such as the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 
2009-2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic and the recent spread of C. difficile from North America, and their 
rapid transmission via the global airline network, have highlighted the porous nature of national 
boundaries (Budd et al., 2009, 2011; Gallagher, 2012; He et al., 2012). The state’s political and 
technical response to these often unpredictable threats, motivated by an imperative to protect its 
borders, has been widely theorised as ‘biosecurity’ (Braun, 2007). Whilst infectious disease has 
historically been represented as a threat emanating from the ‘outside’ (Kraut, 1995; Nerlich et al., 2009), 
biosecurity interventions have become an increasingly prominent subject of enquiry as scholars seek to 
understand various forms of expertise and practices through which disease threats can be articulated 
and managed, in relation to diverse scenarios including bioterrorist incidents (Collier et al., 2004), 
large-scale natural disasters (Collier and Lakoff, 2008) and the securitisation of populations, networks 
and social welfare (Bingham et al., 2008).  
 
Braun, in his discussion of ‘emergent risks’, has argued that practices of biosecurity have changed the 
geographies of health security, and, with it, the whole notion of surveillance and control (2007: 6). 
Increasingly, states such as the US were, in an attempt to contain existing and future pandemics, 
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deploying strategies inspired by the military, including acting extra-territorially (Bingham et al., 2008; 
Braun, 2007; Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Indeed, in making a decision to take the fight against disease 
‘over there’ before it ‘reaches here’ (Braun, 2007: 22), states in the global North, in particular, were 
engaging in geopolitical manoeuvres analogous to those which formed part of the ‘war on terror’. 
Similarly, Ingram, in his analysis of US post-9/11 support of HIV/AIDS interventions in Nigeria, 
contended that the actions of the US government resulted in ‘biopolitics’ ‘being projected on to, and 
being combined with, geopolitics’ as part of the process of imagining, contesting and controlling global 
space (2007: 512; see also 2010a, 2010b). Through their problematisation as security threats – 
alongside terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – infectious diseases were thus equated with 
military activities, with the US Department of Defense, for example, taking a prominent role in that 
country’s HIV/AIDS prevention activities (Ingram, 2010a). In addition, biosecurity enactments were 
present in states, and sites, not subjected to such intensive oversight by a global ‘power’, as 
contemporary disease preparedness created new geographies of containment and control within many 
countries. These measures often commenced before the passenger entered an airport and continued 
long after arrival at their final destination (Warren et al., 2010). During the SARS epidemic and the 
more recent H1N1 influenza pandemic, state interventions included: enforced home quarantine; 
proscription of travel on public transport; and prohibition of gatherings in public spaces. At the 
international airport, moreover, health screening technologies - such as thermal image scanning - have 
increasingly been deployed (Welshman 2006; Budd et al, 2011). The effectiveness of these responses, 
often motivated by political imperatives, such as the desire of national governments to be ‘visible’ 
(Barker, 2012), have been questioned by clinicians (Abubakar, 2009; Cowling et al, 2010; Priest et al, 
2011).   
 
Increasingly, therefore, states and transnational institutions are harnessing surveillance technologies 
and data-sharing networks to help achieve their biosecurity goals (Warren et al., in press). These tools 
and techniques, sometimes referred to as systems of ‘biosurveillance’ (Lyon et al., 2012; Parry, 2012), 
monitor data from published news sources in order to locate infectious disease ‘events’ as they emerge 
in ‘real-time’. At the global scale, they include the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), 
HealthMap and BioCaster. All three automatically gather and analyse unstructured and open source 
information, with GPHIN in addition employing staff to verify the harvested data (Keller et al., 2009; 
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Lyon et al., 2012). The global reach of these systems, combined with their location in countries of the 
global North (where expertise is deemed to be situated) has led to some criticism that they act 
predominantly in the interests of these specific countries (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2006; Bingham et al., 
2008; Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Ingram, 2010b). Furthermore, in relation to TB, more targeted systems 
of cross-jurisdictional bio-information surveillance are under development, collecting information on 
individuals screened for the disease prior to entry on behalf of specific countries such as the UK and 
Australia (IOM, WWWa; DIAC, 2012). Chambers et al, in their analysis of the UK’s response to the 
2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak cautioned that such embedded biosecurity and 
biosurveillance systems exerted a 'spatial homogeneity’ and imposed a ‘biosecurity logic’ which 
masked the differentiated patterns of disease spread (2012: 744). Moreover, Barker, in her discussion 
on the anticipatory governance of the H1N1 outbreak, contested that the UK’s ‘hyper-sensitised global 
health security architecture’ deployed during the H1N1 influenza outbreak, with its arguable over-
reliance on modelling data to predict future pandemic trends, generated a predetermined ‘bureaucratic 
reflex’, a security response which disregarded the epidemiological and spatial ‘actualities’ of the 
disease (2012b: 701; see also, Anderson, 2010).  
 
These connections between government, power and space have been the subject of significant, 
Foucauldian-inspired, work in geography (Philo, 1992; Crampton and Elden, 2007; Ingram, 2010a, 
2010b). This stimulus has been used specifically to problematise state actions against potentially 
infectious populations and bodies as acts of ‘governmentality’. According to Ingram, power exercised in 
this way is ‘tactical and situated, but capable of being networked across different sites’ (2010a: 295). A 
state’s attempt to 'biosecuritise' the border against, and manage the response to, the spread of 
infectious disease during transmission can have a totalising effect. ‘Biosecuritisation’, defined in this 
paper as interventions aimed at safeguarding specific sites against pathogenic threats, has been 
discussed in the institutional context in reference to hospital provision (Fisher and Monahan, 2011) and 
trading in synthetic blood (Weston, 2013). Surprisingly, it has yet to be critiqued by geographers in 
relation to state anticipatory actions aimed at securing the border in order to pre-empt any disease 
outbreak (Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Adey, 2009; Anderson, 2010). The UK government’s recent 
expansion of its pre-entry TB screening programme, as one measure to ‘prevent and control TB in the 
UK’ (Home Office, 2012a), both exemplifies biosecuritisation and, through the surveillance of bodies 
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located beyond sovereign territory, extends its geographical reach. I will critique the processes involved 
in (re)locating these enactments to sites ‘beyond the shore’, using pre-entry screening of TB as a case 
study.   
 
Tuberculosis has been marked by powerful associations since colonial times, and has frequently been 
cast as a disease of migration (Kraut, 1995; Bashford, 2002; King, 2003; Coker and Ingram, 2006; 
Welshman, 2006). Its resurgence in many European and North American countries since the 1980s - 
and clear differences in TB morbidity rates ‘according to race, ethnicity and place of birth’ (King, 2003: 
40) - has, according to King, led to ‘renewed concern over the borders that separate people’ (2003: 40). 
More recently, public anxiety, often stoked by national media reporting on infectious disease outbreaks 
(Bell et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2010), has depicted the need to guard against the threat from ‘‘within’ a 
state’ (Budd et al., 2011: 276). It is in this context that the UK has, over the last decade, extended its 
surveillance of the disease beyond its borders through pre-entry screening of migrants. A pilot 
programme, commencing in October 2005, was soon expanded to cover migrants from 15 countries, all 
located in the global South, where the disease was deemed to be ‘highly prevalent’ (UKBA, 2012a) 
(refer to Table 1). In May 2012, it was further extended, to affect migrants from 84 nations. As the only 
pathological condition to be screened by the UK government on a 'wholesale basis' (UKBA, personal 
communication, 2 July 2012), the increased detection and management of TB through offshore 
screening wields significant geopolitical potential. Consequently, there is a need for geographers to 
investigate, and critique the governance of these enhanced biosecurity measures across global, 
national and local spatial settings in order to highlight the ethical, epidemiological, logistical and 
financial dilemmas presented by these enactments in an age of significant cross-border human mobility 
(Budd et al., 2011). Yet, in spite of research into historical approaches to screening for infectious 
disease (Bashford, 2002; Fidler, 2006) and analysis of the global public health governance of the 
(aero)mobile body in relation to changing patterns of aviation travel (Budd et al., 2009, 2011), there has 
been surprisingly little examination within the discipline of geography of the expanding state practices 
of extra-territorial sanitary border control. 
 
 
3. Pre-entry screening for tuberculosis in the UK 
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3.1 Methods 
Empirical research was conducted from May 2012 to January 2013. An analysis was undertaken of 
policy documents, technical guidance and written statements produced by selected UK government 
departments and agencies, including the Department of Health, the Home Office, the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) and the Health Protection Agency (HPA), which became part of Public Health England 
(PHE) in April 2013. A similar investigation was undertaken into grey literature produced on offshore 
tuberculosis screening by equivalent institutions in the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and 
into related documentation produced by inter-governmental agencies such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This review resulted in the 
identification of points of contact, including named individuals with expertise in policy, security and 
public health based in the UK and overseas, who were approached for interview. Due to time and cost 
constraints, interviews took place remotely, via telephone or Skype. Where full interviews were not 
possible, a list of questions was sent electronically for answer. As a result, data was collected from 
stakeholders from UK government agencies, with responsibilities for security and health, public officials 
holding similar posts in the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and a non-profit organisation 
(NPO) engaged in pre-entry screening in selected overseas countries. Respondents were asked about 
the genealogy and governance of the UK’s pre-entry screening procedures for TB, and for information 
on: antecedent programmes; collaborations with other countries engaged in similar activity, including 
the sharing of ‘best practice’; partnerships with third sector or private organisations; variations in 
methods of disease detection; monitoring and quality control; and plans for the expansion of existing 
pre-entry screening programmes. Further data on geographical coverage, number of visa applicants 
screened and costs of testing borne by individual migrants were obtained from official sources, such as 
the UKBA, the UK Department of Health and HPA, whilst information on comparative disease detection 
schemes was gathered from scholarly studies into pre-entry and port of entry TB detection, largely 
published in the medical and public health literature. The data collected from this combination of 
sources facilitated analysis of the operation and governance of the UK’s pre-entry TB screening 
procedures. 
 
3.2 Early debates 
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Tuberculosis is a bacterial infection, caused by the mycobacterium tuberculosis bacterium. 
Approximately 5-10% of individuals infected with the condition become ill at some point in their life. 
Only pulmonary (lung-based) tuberculosis is contagious, and in that instance, the bacteria are usually 
transmitted through coughing or sneezing, during close and prolonged contact. According to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) data, the absolute number of TB cases worldwide has been falling since 
2006 (WHO, 2012). Yet, the global burden of disease remains significant, with an estimated 8.7 million 
new cases emerging in 2011 (WHO, 2012). In the UK, the number of reported cases has continued to 
increase, although at a slower rate in recent years, rising from 8,363 in 2006 to 8,963 in 2011 (HPA, 
2012). The UK HPA, the government agency responsible for public protection against infectious 
diseases until its abolition in April 2013, reported that TB prevalence among the non-UK born 
population was ‘20 times the rate in the UK-born' (HPA, 2012: 4). Nevertheless, as the mycobacterium 
tuberculosis bacteria can remain latent in the infected body for many years, detection can be difficult. In 
particular, the reliance on chest x-rays for port of entry screening (and as part of the pilot pre-entry 
assessments) at London Heathrow and Gatwick airports was seen to be problematic as this technique 
overlooked latent pulmonary cases (Moore-Gillon et al., 2010). This represented a significant weakness, 
as, in 2011, over three quarters of tuberculosis cases reported in the UK among those born overseas 
were diagnosed two or more years after arrival into the country (HPA, 2012).  
 
The UK has a long history of engaging in port of entry assessments for tuberculosis, with the 1905 
Aliens Act providing for the health screening of new migrants through the appointment of a Port 
Medical Inspector (UKBA, 2012a). Moreover, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was an increased 
discussion in policy circles - promoted in particular by Enoch Powell when Minister of Health (1960-
1963) – of the use of offshore screening (Welshman, 2006)2. Nevertheless, objections were raised to 
these proposals within government, not least on economic grounds. The UK required overseas workers 
to facilitate post-war economic recovery and did not wish not to antagonise key trading partners, such 
as India and Pakistan 3. In addition, medical professionals voiced concerns about the difficulty of 
                                                          
2 The proposals put forward were based on the so-called ‘Australian model’ whereby potential immigrants were 
(‘irrespective of nationality or length of stay’) required to possess a medical certificate indicating ‘a sound state of health’ 
(Welshman, 2006: 298) 
3 In addition, UK employers, desperate for labour in circumstances where demand outstripped supply, expressed concern  
about potential difficulties in declaring workers ‘free’ from tuberculosis, a factor which may delay, and add to the cost of, 
staff recruitment (Welshman, 2006: 299).  
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ensuring adequate standards of medical certification in the country of origin, and at the potential 
expense of sending UK doctors abroad to oversee certification of migrants (Welshman, 2006: 299). 
Thus, although following the promulgation of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants’ Act, arrangements 
for pre-entry medical examination were set up in selected Commonwealth countries, the UK 
government elected not to conduct extra-territorial screening (Welshman, 2006: 301). Nevertheless, as 
the same legislation permitted port health authorities and immigration officers to refer certain categories 
of people for medical examination on-entry, chest radiographs were introduced at London Heathrow 
and London Gatwick airports from 1965 (Welshman and Bashford, 2006). Yet, until its increased use 
against asylum seekers from the 1990s, this technology formed, in the UK, only a ‘minor part of medical 
examinations as a whole’ (Welshman, 2006: 305). Instead, devolved, community-based enactments, 
whereby migrants were permitted to enter the country as long as they reported their arrival to a local 
medical officer, took precedence (Welshman, 2006: 308). 
 
3.3 Pre-entry screening  
In the last decade, UK policy has shifted towards screening migrants prior to their arrival in the host 
country. This has been motivated by factors including increased passenger flows to regional airports, 
concerns about the efficacy of on-entry screening at London Heathrow and London Gatwick airports 
and lower than expected migrant registration with community-based GPs once in the UK (UKBA, 
2012a). Domestic political considerations, in particular strong anti-immigration sentiment increasingly 
expressed by sections of UK society (Light and Young, 2009; Mulvey, 2011), were also likely to have 
driven government action in this area. However, these concerns were not generally intimated within the 
official literature on this topic. In 2005, the UK government announced pre-entry TB screening of 
applicants for visas permitting stays of more than six months. Aimed at providing ‘secure borders’, the 
screening - funded by the migrant - was targeted at ‘high risk areas’, with the additional requirement 
that those diagnosed with TB 'seek treatment at home before being allowed to enter the UK' (Home 
Office, 2005: 25-26, italics added). The initial set up costs of the pre-entry programme were estimated 
to be £1.1m, with subsequent running costs being ‘recouped’ through the fees (approximately US$50 - 
US$70) charged by in-country clinics (UKBA, 2012a). Official documents made it clear that the costs of 
any required treatment would ‘fall upon visa applicants and overseas health authorities and not on the 
UK taxpayer’ (UKBA, 2012a). The pilot scheme was initially implemented in four countries - 
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Bangladesh, Tanzania, Thailand and Sudan - amid concern that it may encourage behaviour that 
would, in the words of one UK expert, "tend to hide the presence of the disease’’ (Sommerfield, in 
Khanal, 2005: 726). By the end of 2007, it had been expanded to include migrants from 15 'high-risk' 
states (HoL, 2010). Significantly, the screening did not always take place in the migrant country of 
origin. Clinics in some states, for example, Ghana, conducted screening on behalf of other 
geographically proximate countries, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo and Niger (refer to 
Table 1). These arrangements further complicated the extra-territorial governance of migrant health.  
 
 
***Insert Table 1 here*** 
 
 
The screening procedures, managed during the pilot stage on behalf of the UKBA by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), an inter-governmental agency4, followed a protocol, agreed jointly by 
the UK government and affected 'high risk' states (UKBA, 2012a). In most cases, they commenced with 
a chest x-ray, although exceptions were made for children under the age of 11 and pregnant women5 
(UKBA, 2012a, 2012b). Applicants found to have radiological abnormalities consistent with TB also 
undertook three sputum smear tests (UKBA, 2012a). This involved the patient being instructed to 
cough up a sample of sputum, the thick fluid produced in the lungs and the airways leading to the lungs, 
on three consecutive days. A thin layer of the sample (the smear) is placed on a glass slide, a series of 
stains are applied and it is examined under a microscope for signs of the TB bacteria (GHE, 2012). In 
2007, an ‘enhanced’ screening protocol was introduced by the UKBA and IOM, ensuring that 
individuals with clinical findings highly suggestive of infectious TB underwent additional bacteriological 
(sputum culture) tests (UKBA, 2012a: 26). These tests, involving the cultivation and identification of 
mycobacterium tuberculosis in laboratory conditions, provided a ‘definitive’ diagnosis of the disease 
(GHE, 2012). However, the slow growth of the TB culture, meant it took an average of four weeks to 
                                                          
4 The IOM was established in 1951. Its membership comprises 149 states (IOM, WWWb). 
5 UKBA guidance stated that children aged under 11 should have a health questionnaire completed on their behalf and 
undergo a simple risk assessment to determine whether they were at risk of pulmonary TB (UKBA, 2012b). The use of chest 
x-rays to screen pregnant women was more complex, dependent on a number of factors including: the stage of pregnancy; 
whether the applicant has recently undergone another x-ray; and the discretion of the clinician. Applicants unwilling - or 
unable for medical reasons - to undertake chest x-rays were required to provide sputum specimens in a designated 
laboratory for smear and culture tests (UKBA, 2012b).  
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achieve a conclusive result, and four to six weeks longer if also testing for drug susceptibility (GHE, 
2012)6. According to a senior medical officer employed at an NPO, such delays were initially perceived 
in the UK to be an ‘obstruction’ (personal communication, 15/11/12). However, evidence from other 
countries of higher detection rates resulting from the culture tests persuaded the UK government to add 
this technique to its pre-entry screening protocols (UKBA, 2012a; UKBA, personal communication, 
02/07/12). Sputum culture testing was thus phased in across the screening centres between October 
2007 and December 2009, with applicants who registered positive during the assessment procedures 
being denied a certificate of clearance by the IOM (UKBA, 2012a). According to the UKBA’s own 
analysis, based on data supplied by the IOM and estimates from the UK National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), the pilot phase of the project generated potential savings to the NHS of 
approximately £2.1m from its inception to August 2010 (UKBA, 2012a). 
 
Whilst pre-entry screening of mobile bodies by sovereign states for infectious disease is not a new 
occurrence (Gandy and Zumla, 2002; King, 2002, 2003; Bell, et al., 2006), the UK's enactments for 
tuberculosis represented a more comprehensive 'biosecuritisation' of the migrant body, spatially and 
temporally. Since the launch of the pilot in 2005, a sophisticated apparatus has been developed by the 
UK state to allow potential migrant bodies to be examined extra-territorially, and for sensitive personal 
and biological data to be collected, scrutinised and shared across borders. As part of the pre-entry TB 
detection programme, a central database has been developed by the IOM to 'keep records of all 
applicants undergoing testing' (IOM, WWWa). Information held on this database included applicant 
name, gender, nationality7, country of application, health details and screening test results (UKBA, 
2012a; IOM, 2010). During the pilot stage, all the data bar individual names was shared with the UK 
government, representing the transfer of details of over 550,000 applicants from the initiation of the 
pre-entry screening programme until December 2011 (UKBA, 2012a; IOM, 2012)8.  
 
                                                          
6 As the number and proportion of drug resistant TB cases increases (HPA, 2012; WHO, 2012), this form of testing has 
become increasingly necessary. Globally, 3.7% of new cases and 20% of previously treated cases were estimated to have 
multi drug resistant (MDR) TB (WHO, 2012: 2). In the UK, 1.3% of new cases and 5.6% of those with a previous history of TB 
were diagnosed with MDR TB (HPA, 2012: 10). 95% of MDR TB cases in the UK were born outside of the country (HPA, 2012: 
10).  
7 This was not always clear due to migrants resident in certain countries being screened at centres in other countries (for 
example nationals of Laos may be assessed in Thailand) (UKBA, 2012a).  
8 It is unclear exactly which UK government agencies have access to this pre-entry screening data, although the UKBA 
Review suggested it has been shared with the HPA and the Department of Health  (UKBA, 2012a).  
Warren, A. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.04.024 
14 
 
3.4 Expansion: from single service provider to ‘mixed economy’ 
The current expansion of pre-entry screening for tuberculosis, announced by the Home Office in May 
2012 and being implemented in three six-monthly phases between July 2012 and December 2013, will 
extend surveillance to migrants from a further 69 countries (refer to Table 2). Based on existing Home 
Office data on migrants granted leave to enter the UK for over six months, when fully implemented, the 
expanded scheme may result in the assessment of an additional 350,000 individuals per annum for 
tuberculosis (refer to Table 2). By contrast, the IOM screened approximately 98,000 UK visa 
applications from the 15 pilot countries in 2011 (IOM, 2012: 33). However, and significantly, in 
extending pre-entry screening to other countries, the UK government has indicated that the IOM will not 
be the only service provider and it is, therefore, highly unlikely that the details of all visa applicants will, 
at the point of collection, appear on the same database. Instead, UK officials will aim for a ‘mixed 
economy’ of public, private and third sector providers (UKBA, personal communication, 02/07/12; 
UKBA, 2012a).  
 
 
***Insert Table 2 here*** 
 
 
This diversification of screening suppliers across spatial settings by the UK government can be 
theorised as a logical outcome of neoliberal governmentality, with the state seeking to divest service 
provision to multiple suppliers (Fyfe, 2005; Ong, 2007; Ferguson, 2010). The extra-territorial nature of 
these interventions attests to dynamics associated with the neoliberal such as ‘mobility of practice, 
responsiveness to contingencies and strategic entanglements with politics’ (Ong, 2007: 3).  As Ong has 
argued, neoliberal governmentality is not a ‘hegemonic order’ or a unifed set of practices (2007: 7). 
Rather, it is shaped by a ‘global assemblage’, sites in which individual and collective existence are 
subject to ‘technological, political, and ethical reflection and intervention’ (Collier and Ong, 2005: 4; see 
also Allen, 2011). Empirically, these interventions raise important questions for the governance of pre-
entry TB screening across geographical boundaries. For example, to what extent can a national 
government enforce varied screening enactments across diverse spatial settings? How can standards 
of certification - a concern raised by medical professionals when UK government ministers suggested 
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pre-entry screening five decades previously - be translated across boundaries? How is access to 
sovereign territories, and individual migrant bodies located in those settings, negotiated? Interventions 
on behalf of the UK government may involve the IOM continuing to screen migrants in states where it 
already has a presence, due to its pre-entry assessment work for other nations of the global North such 
as US, Canada and Australia. Alternatively, screening may be conducted by assorted providers from 
public, private or third sectors. In countries with particularly large populations, such as India from where 
over 120,000 migrants were granted leave to enter the UK in 2011, the ‘mixed economy’ has been 
applied within another state’s boundaries, with pre-entry TB screening - introduced in August 2012 - 
being enacted largely by private physicians approved by the UKBA (UKBA, 2012c).  
 
Significantly, the approved clinicians in India were also acting on behalf of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the US, indicative of increased transnational collaboration by the countries of the global 
North in the governance extra-territorial screening for infectious disease. Much of this joint working has 
been through the Five Country Conference (FCC), a prominent forum which has adopted a leading role 
in the oversight and enactment of cross jurisdictional TB assessments. The FCC, arguably one of 
Philo's 'supra-state organisations' (2012: 1), has been in existence with varying membership for over a 
decade. It has a broad remit of encouraging dialogue among government officials on security and 
immigration matters (Young, 2000; Canada International, 2011), and currently comprises the UK, US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand9. In 2012, the UKBA reported that they had worked with other 
FCC countries to harmonise pre-entry screening arrangements, learn lessons and pool expertise in 
countries where the UK does not currently operate (personal communication, 30/10/12). According to a 
New Zealand public official, this collaboration enables member states to identify 'reliable physicians 
and laboratories offshore' to screen individuals intending to travel to FCC countries (personal 
communication, 6/11/12). In addition, the FCC are working together to 'fully harmonise [these] lists of 
approved physicians and laboratories' (public official, personal communication, 6/11/12). The 
securitisation of the migrant body, and with it the biosecuritisation of the national border, is therefore 
ever more dependent on interactions between local, state and transnational agencies. Practices 
become transformed as they are implemented across diverse spatial and political settings (Ong, 2007), 
                                                          
9 Prior to New Zealand joining in June 2009, the FCC had operated as the Four Country Conference.  
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opening up avenues for further investigation in relation to scales of public health governance (Bell et al., 
2012) and spaces of biosecurity and biosurveillance (Warren et al., in press).  
 
 
4. Governing (multi-)border biosecuritisation 
 
4.1 Multi-scalar governance 
The increased monitoring and management of tuberculosis incidence among migrant populations 
within their country of origin by states including the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
requires further interrogation of the interactions involved in public health governance across various 
geographical scales. These trends have been recently analysed in the geographies of health literature 
on the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic in relation to the tensions between national policy-making and local 
responses within the UK (Chambers et al., 2012) and emergent local-national-global dialogues during 
the unfolding of an unexpected pathological event (Bell et al., 2012). Yet, there has been far less 
investigation into the motivations behind the enactment of biosecuritisation measures, the spatial 
assemblage of the apparatus used, and its outcomes in terms of governance and geopolitics (Allen, 
1999). Research into this topic matters, as the screening of bodies beyond the border represents not 
just as extension of sovereign-juridical power, but also the administration of potential ban on 
transnational mobility conditional on receiving treatment. In the case of pre-entry assessments for TB, 
the state has sought to influence and manage operations - including screening, assessing and 
documenting of migrants - over localities situated in another sovereign territory potentially many 
thousands of miles away. These operations are thus dependent on the collaborative work of non-
governmental agencies or approved physicians.  Arguably, this shift may necessitate a more 
fragmented system of health governance, with the state dependent on, and required to assemble, 
information collected by numerous providers.  
 
At the same time, the requirement for effective governance of pre-entry TB screening has resulted in 
the construction of new alliances between nations, as states engaged in pre-entry screening 
interventions sought to ‘scale up’ (Mangham and Hanson, 2010: 85), harmonising their practices and 
sharing resources (UKBA, 2012a). For the UK this was important as, although its pre-entry TB 
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screening programme has been in place for almost a decade, it was not the first country to engage in 
this activity, with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issuing Technical 
Instructions for pre-departure TB screening of refugees in 1991 (CDC, 2012). Transnational alliances, 
such as the FCC, developed in response, motivated by national imperatives in their desire to 
biosecuritise their borders. They were formed independently of, and operated in parallel with, 
established institutions of public health governance, such as the WHO. Thus, state strategic priorities 
not only drove actions at the local scale, but also in countries across the globe. Increasingly, and 
building on Amoore and Hall, these interventions seek to disassemble the body of the migrant, examine 
it against specific criteria and then reconstitute it as a ‘risk’ or an ‘anomaly’ (2009: 453-4). Practices of 
biosecuritisation are ever more being undertaken by a select group of nations, based in the global 
North, and applied within, and across, multiple spatial settings, including groups of countries, specific 
territories, categories of individuals and the individual migrant body. These enactments necessitate a 
selection of screening methods, the appointment of clinicians and technical staff, provision of 
appropriate assessment criteria, and the collection and sharing of migrant personal data. Yet, these 
processes are not homogenous. Within the biosecurity apparatus, spaces remain for negotiation, and 
potential circumvention, of some of the procedures.  
 
4.2 Biosecuritisation of the migrant body 
Prior to departure, the body of the migrant is biosecured (Salter, 2004; Adey 2004, 2009). Depending 
on the applicant's circumstances, the individual is subjected to chest radiography, and bodily samples 
are sent for laboratory testing. If active pulmonary TB is diagnosed, the positive mycobacterium 
tuberculosis cultures undergo drug susceptibility testing in a designated laboratory, whilst the applicant 
is referred for treatment for a minimum six month period. As the availability, quality and possibly cost of 
the treatment will vary from country to country, this programme arguably entrenches existing global 
health inequalities (Gandy and Zumla, 2002; Sparke and Anguelov, 2012). In addition, the home 
country physician is obliged to report positive cases to the UK immigration authorities 'as they shall 
direct' (UKBA, 2012b: 10). If an applicant is judged not to have active pulmonary TB, a certificate is 
issued with a validity of six months (UKBA, 2012b). Migrant bodies at various points across the globe 
are thus biosecuritised, regulated and continually monitored by the UK authorities as an act of 
‘governmentality’ (Ingram, 2010a). The practices of the physician in the locality are written into the 
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UKBA's Technical Instructions (UKBA 2012b) and their 'processes and protocols […], the screening 
process and the laboratory site' are open to possible 'visit, audit and evaluat[ion]' (UKBA, 2012b: 12). In 
this way, to develop Ingram's work on biosecurity and international responses to HIV/AIDS, state 
governmentality has become 'stretch[ed]' and applied to 'a range of sites, spaces and positionalities' 
across the globe (2010a: 300). However, variations may exist in the intensity of this ‘governance-at-a-
distance’ (Barnett, 2005: 9; see also Allen, 2003, 2011), with the ‘effective’ biosecuritisation dependent 
on various logics and practices of physicians, technicians and public health infrastructure located in 
diverse overseas territories. Accordingly, Allen, in a similar fashion to Collier and Ong (2005), promotes 
the ‘assemblage’ as way of thinking through how institutional arrangements of power may hold together 
in spite of, as in the case of offshore TB screening, differences in institutional arrangements and the 
‘various power plays’ that ‘shape the politics of regions and nation states’ (2011: 154).  
 
Certainly, this notion of assemblage opens up avenues of enquiry about the aforementioned ‘various 
middle ranges of agency’ (Barnett, 2005: 9), many of which are currently being negotiated between the 
UK and individual countries of the global South, and the extent of their biosecuritisation of the migrant 
body. Indeed, the power relations between the UK and the affected populations in the South are, 
arguably, far from being ‘centred’ (Allen, 2011: 154). The promotion of a ‘mixed economy’ on the health 
screening provision, and the potential for variations in data collected from diverse organisations in 
public, private and non-profit spheres, may result in geographically uneven enactments which are more 
fragmented, disrupted and subject to contestation (Ong, 2007; Ferguson, 2010). Moreover, the 
successful outcome of this policy is dependent on cooperation from countries and migrants in the 
South, leaving more scope for autonomy and individual action than some commentators (for example, 
Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2006, 2010) may allow. Access to sovereign territory requires negotiation and 
the extent to which the governance of extra-territorial health interventions can reach across borders 
may be influenced by economic and geopolitical factors (Allen, 2003, 2011; Ingram, 2010a, 2010b). For 
example, there remained concerns within the UK government - similar to those expressed by officials 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Welshman, 2006) - that measures to introduce pre-entry screening to 
India may damage trading relations with a strategically important nation (NPO, personal communication, 
15/11/12). Moreover, medical professionals have been alert to difficulties in gaining access to specific 
countries, for example, China, Malaysia and Indonesia (NPO, personal communication, 15/11/12; 
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UNHCR, 2012). Although pre-entry screening is now underway, the means of implementation remain 
open to discussion in many of the 69 additional countries with a high incidence of TB. The successful 
operation of a large scale disease assessment, particularly in more populous states with burgeoning 
mobile populations, is therefore subject to negotiation and contention. This is in part indicative of the 
changing geopolitics and shifting power relations between countries of the global North and rising 
economic powers located in the South (Warren et al., in press).  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The expansion of pre-entry screening for TB by the UK government to over 80 countries including the 
two most populous nations, India and China, raises new questions about the geographies of biosecurity 
and public health surveillance. I have sought to identify how the changing conceptions of borders, in 
part shaped by increased personal mobility, have resulted in the demarcation of new spaces of 
(bio)security by states through actions which extend beyond their sovereign territory. It is within these 
spatial settings that the UK and other countries of the global North have endeavoured to orchestrate 
particular forms of governmentality to contain and control the bodies of potential migrants prior to their 
departure from their homelands. That this process has been exerted extra-territorially is clear by 
reference to the extent to which health assessment protocols, instructions to physicians, certifications, 
audits, siting of laboratories and sharing of applicant biological data are being managed by the UK 
authorities.  This form of surveillance has been problematised as exercising spatial homogeneity and 
imposing a biosecurity logic on infectious disease events (Chambers et al., 2012). Yet my investigation 
suggests that, as the number of countries subject to these biosecuritisation processes continues to 
expand, space exists for greater diversity of practice as states seek to negotiate the screening of 
applicants with affected countries, and geopolitical and resource considerations ensure that the 
biosecuritisation of these additional spaces and populations is enacted through a diverse range of 
service providers.  
 
The state's use of offshore biosecurity processes to safeguard against the threat of TB has, therefore, 
advanced in complex and dynamic ways. Countries of the global North desire to protect 'their' 
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populations against infectious diseases in an era of increased population mobility. Yet, these states 
also require inward migration to improve economic growth and remain competitive in the global 
marketplace. A mutual dependency therefore exists between states of the North and the South, 
although, in terms of biosecurity, many of the spaces and sites of contestation have shifted to the 
countries in the developing regions. There is a role for geographers in continuing to critically engage 
with these spatialities in their different forms and in assessing the scalar contradictions that exist 
between the varied local origins of infectious diseases and their global reach. In these ways, 
geographical research can make a significant contribution to the broader theoretical and policy debates 
surrounding offshore public health interventions.  
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Table 1 
Pilot countries subject to pre-entry screening for TB by the UK 
 
Country (site of 
screening, if 
different) 
Estimated TB rate / 
100,000 populationa 
Number of migrants 
granted leave to 
enter the UK (2011)b 
Country of 
application, 
if different  
Oversight 
of testing 
Bangladesh 411 10,195   IOM 
Burkina Faso#  85 35 Ghana  
Cambodia 817 110   IOM 
Cote D'Ivoire# 250   Ghana  
Eritrea##  151 530 Kenya    
Ghana 92 3890   IOM 
Kenya  291 2110   IOM 
Laos### 540 30 Thailand   
Niger# 166 20 Ghana  
Pakistan  350 52,310   IOM 
Somalia## 523 1310 Kenya    
Sudan  201 1080   IOM 
Tanzania 177 840   IOM 
Thailand 161 9135   IOM 
Togo#  96 35 Ghana  
            
#Applications processed in Ghana          
##Applications processed in Kenya           
###Applications processed in Thailand          
           
a Source: WHO, 2012. All figures are recorded by the WHO as including HIV and TB.   
   
b Source: Home Office, 2012b. Figures exclude foreign national visitors, passengers in transit and passengers 
returning after temp absence abroad. 
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Table 2 
Additional countries subject to pre-entry screening for TB by the UK 
from July 2012 
 
Country  Estimated TB rate / 100,000 populationa 
Number of migrants 
granted leave to enter 
UK (2011)b 
Afghanistan 351 3,280 
Angola 413 370 
Bhutan 230 30 
Bolivia 205 135 
Botswana 360 315 
Burundi 192 35 
Cameroon 299 1,185 
Cape Verdi  230 60 
Central African Rep 510 0 
Chad 191 5 
China  104 60,825 
China, Hong Kong SAR  99 7820 
China, Macau 94 125 
Congo 473 260 
Congo, Dem Rep  512 75 
Djibouti 840 20 
Ecuador 98 445 
Equatorial Guinea 267 20 
Ethiopia  237 615 
Gabon 505 50 
Gambia 455 590 
Guinea  242 145 
Guinea-Bissau 268 30 
Guyana  121 300 
Haiti 307 55 
India 249 123,530 
Indonesia 281 9.085 
Kazakhstan 168 2.575 
Kiribati 462 0 
Korea, Dem People's 
Rep  422 5 
Korea, Rep of 149 8,885 
Kyrgyzstan 175 150 
Lesotho 411 25 
Liberia 453 60 
Madagascar 428 230 
Malawi 164 140 
Malaysia 101 10,255 
Mali 90 60 
Mauritania 686 15 
Micronesia 294 0 
Moldova 234 285 
Mongolia 348 260 
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a Source: WHO, 2012. All figures are recorded by the WHO as including HIV and TB.                           
b Source: Home Office, 2012b. Figures exclude foreign national visitors, passengers in transit and passengers 
returning after temp absence abroad. 
 
 
Morocco 131 1,770 
Mozambique 490 70 
Myanmar 506 440 
Namibia 729 120 
Nepal 243 9,120 
Nigeria 171 19,720 
Papua New Guinea 534 30 
Peru 117 1,145 
Philippines 484 52,090 
Russian Fed 124 10,760 
Rwanda 117 110 
Sao Tome & Principe 151 15 
Senegal  200 230 
Sierra Leone 1,370 470 
Solomon Islands 162 0 
South Africa 768 9,310 
Suriname 51 10 
Swaziland 854 35 
Tajikistan 350 85 
Timor-Leste 701 15 
Tuvalu 381 0 
Uganda 183 935 
Ukraine  104 5,230 
Uzbekistan 177 310 
Vietnam 323 3,410 
Zambia 352 610 
Zimbabwe  547 2,060 
Total    350,450 
